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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of governance on remittances with specific focus on
accounting for heterogeneity in the relationship. Using nonparametric kernel methods
that are robust to arbitrary forms of non-linearity, heterogeneity and model specifica-
tion, and six governance measures from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), the
relationship is analysed for 109 countries for the period 1996–2014. The findings show
that all six measures: voice and accountability, political stability, government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are significantly related
with remittances. Moreover, the relationship is highly nonlinear and heterogeneous
across countries or regions, and time. In addition, specific aspects of governance
quality matter differently for remittances across each regional groupings. Hence, there
is the need for country-specific rather than a one-size fits all governance reform agenda.
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1 Introduction
Migrants’ remittances have increased substantially in recent years. For developing countries,
projected estimates of $435 billion in 2015 signified a 30 percent increase over the 2010
estimates of $336 billion (World Bank, 2015). This represent over 70 percent of the recorded
total flows which makes it the second largest source of external finance behind foreign direct
investment while doubling the amount of official development assistance.1 More so, due
to its stable and countercyclical nature, remittances have proved resilient during periods
of economic downturns such as the 2007-09 global economic crisis. Meanwhile, evidence
suggest that remittances lead to reduction in poverty and inequality through channels of
consumption, savings and investment (see Adams, 2009; Gupta et al., 2009); promotes
financial development and growth by easing financing constraints and enhancing access to
credit (see Aggarwal et al., 2011; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009); reduces the likelihood
of financial crises among others. Likewise, it could have adverse effects either by inducing
real exchange rate appreciation (the so-called “Dutch Disease” effect) (Acosta et al., 2009),
or reducing labour market participation rates as receiving household substitute leisure for
work activities (Chami et al., 2003).
Mainstream economic literature suggest several drivers of remittances which broadly
includes: economic activity in both the migrants’ host and home countries, economic policies
and institutions as well as general risks in the home country, and investment opportunities
(IMF, 2005). For instance, remittances react to the economic conditions in the home country
either for altruistic motives to compensate for negative economic shocks to household income,
or for self-interest motives to exploit investment opportunities (see Lucas and Stark, 1985;
Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002). Also, positive shocks in host countries can translate into
higher remittances (Bettin et al., 2012). Other determinants that have been considered in
the literature include: transaction cost (Freund and Spatafora, 2008), skill and composition
of migrants stocks (Adams, 2009), exchange rates (Faini, 1994), interest rate differential
(El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999) to mention a few. Overall, the evidence on the impact of
these factors on remittances are generally mixed and inconclusive.2
In this paper, we investigate the effect of domestic governance quality as a another
determinant of remittances. We consider it necessary as the remittances and governance
relationship has received little attention in the literature. Earlier studies only considered the
existence of a well-functioning domestic institutions as a channel that enhances the growth
effects of remittances (see Catrinescu et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2010). However, Singh et al.
1This trend in remittances has been associated with growing migration, declining transfer transaction
costs, and availability of diverse medium for money transfer.
2see Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a survey
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(2010) investigated the determinants of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, and finds that
improvement in institutional quality has a positive impact on remittances. Recently, Lartey
and Mengova (2016) finds that both political and economic institutions in the form of sound
monetary policy and government effectiveness are critical for increasing remittances. These
evidence underscores the underlying argument that the quality of governance institutions
can influence the volume and value of remittances. Governance institutions establish the
incentive structure that shape all forms interaction (political, economic and social) in an
economy. In doing so, it reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency thereby leading to
improved economic performance through investment and growth (Catrinescu et al., 2009;
Effiong, 2015). Since remittances are sensitive to the cost of transactions, an improvement
in domestic governance quality can reduce such costs thereby encouraging remittance flows
through the official channel. Further, it can influence remittances driven by self-interest
motives for investment opportunities. For example, a stable polity with enforceable rule
of law are prerequisite for a favourable macroeconomic environment which can increase
remittances as migrants re-allocate their savings between host and home countries for
investment. Despite these positive effect, there exist evidence that higher remittances could
have deleterious consequence for institutional quality (Abdih et al., 2012; Berdiev et al.,
2013). Abdih et al. (2012) in particular shows that access to remittances makes government
corruption less costly for domestic households to bear, and hence such corruption is likely
to increase, as government free-ride and appropriate for its own consumption rather than to
the provision of public goods. Moreover, there is also the possibility that poor governance
quality can lead to higher emigration, and in turn, higher remittances.
One potential issue in identifying the remittances-governance relationship which has
not been considered in the literature is accounting for heterogeneity across countries or
regions. Certainly, countries or regions are not homogeneous, and they differ significantly
both in terms of their stages of development, natural resource endowments, political and
economic institutions etc. Likewise, the effect of domestic governance on remittances can
vary across countries or regions thereby making it imperative to account for parameter
heterogeneity. Also, the existence of parameter heterogeneity could indicate the presence of
non-linearities in the relationship.3 Such arguments for parameter heterogeneity are well
documented in the growth literature (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Durlauf et al., 2005).
As Brock and Durlauf (2001) aptly puts it, “the assumption of parameter homogeneity
seems particularly inappropriate when one is studying complex heterogeneous objects such
as countries.” In such situation, linear parametric models that are incapable of modelling
parameter heterogeneity may be inadequate for investigating the object of interest, and may
provide inconsistent estimates for statistical inference, and in turn, lead to wrong policy
3In other words, the effect may be positive, negative or a combination of both.
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prescriptions. Therefore, greater flexibility in the estimation framework which recognizes
the salient features of the data generating process becomes paramount.
Consequently, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship
between remittances and governance institutions in two fold. First, we incorporate het-
erogeneity in the relationship by allowing the model parameters to vary across countries
or regions. Second, we use nonparametric kernel methods which are robust to arbitrary
form of heterogeneity to estimate the unknown model parameters. The main benefit of
nonparametric models over its parametric counterpart is due to its flexibility in allowing
consistent estimation when the underlying functional form of the regression is unknown (see
e.g. Li and Racine, 2007; Racine, 2008; Henderson and Parmeter, 2015, for a comprehensive
survey). In other words, it does not impose ex ante functional form on the relationship of
interest; rather, it allows the data generating process to determine the true nature of the
relationship. In doing so, nonparametric techniques account for differences among coun-
tries in different regions, and makes valid comparisons in a unifying estimation framework
(Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez, 2009). Our analysis uses World Bank data on remittances and
the six governance measures from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database for
109 countries over the period 1996-2014. Further, we split this sample into four regional
subgroupings namely, Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, to uncover the
relative importance of governance quality on remittances at the regional level. Given the
increasing popularity of nonparametric methods in applied economic analysis, our paper
follow closely with Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez (2009) on governance matters for growth.
Going forward, the balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description
of the datasets. Section 3 presents the model and a description of the nonparametric
estimation strategy; while Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion. Finally,
Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.
2 Data
The relationship between remittances and governance is examined using annual data for
109 countries over the period 1996–2014. These countries are grouped into four regions,
namely, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America (including Caribbean countries)
based on geography (see Table A1 in appendix for country listing). Data for developed
economies such as the Group of Seven (G7) countries, OECD countries of Western Europe
and Australia are excluded because of their structural differences with respect to governance
quality and response to remittances.
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As a multidimensional concept, governance has been operationalized into several in-
dicators for each specific dimension. Governance is often defined as the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This include three dimensions:
(i) the process by which the authority is selected; (ii) the government’s ability to manage
the economy’s resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of the citizens
and the state for established institutions. These dimensions are captured using World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) which are perception-based indices constructed
from an unobserved component methodology into six governance measures, and expressed
in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating better governance quality
(Kaufmann et al., 2006). These measures are:
• Voice and Accountability (voice): captures the extent to which a country’s citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media.
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence (stability): captures the perception of the
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.
• Government Effectiveness (goveff): captures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies.
• Regulatory Quality (requal): captures perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
• Rule of Law (law): captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in, and abide, by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.
• Control of Corruption (concor): captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exploited for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
On the other hand, migrants’ remittances is measured as personal remittances as a
share of GDP (remit).4 Remittances are defined as personal remittances which comprise of
4We transform it to natural logarithm.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
remit voice polstab goveff requal law concor
Mean 0.7229 −0.1867 −0.3311 −0.3111 −0.2137 −0.3728 −0.3766
Std. Dev. 1.6389 0.7513 0.8578 0.6284 0.6318 0.6152 0.5951
Min −5.379 −1.88 −2.81 −2.68 −2.25 −2.07 −1.82
Max 4.1269 1.47 1.42 1.6 1.67 1.45 1.76
Note: remit = Personal remittances (in logs); voice = Voice and Accountability; polstab = Political Stability; goveff =
Government Effectiveness; requal = Regulatory Quality; law = Rule of Law; concor = Control of Corruption.
compensation of employees and personal transfers. Compensation of employees includes
income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in a country
where they are not resident, and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Personal
transfers include current transfers in cash or in kind received by resident households from
non-resident households.5
The data sets are drawn from World Bank online database namely, the WGI for the
six measures of governance quality while migrant’s remittances is collected from World
Development Indicators (WDI). The summary statistics for each of the variables is presented
in Table 1, while Figure 1 shows the conditional density plots between remittances and
the six measures of governance quality. The conditional density plots shows the entire
conditional distribution of the data, and therefore provides a nonparametric alternative to
standard descriptive statistics (Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez, 2007). As shown in Figure 1, a
large dispersions is observed for lower levels of governance especially in the cases of Voice
and Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption; but at
higher levels of Political Stability and Government Effectiveness. Also, there is evidence of
bi-modality at lower levels of Government Effectiveness, and at higher levels of the Rule
of Law. In all, these conditional density plots provides a more complete picture of the
underlying processes generating countries’ remittances and governance.
3 Methodology
In order to pin down the effect of governance on remittances, we follow a similar set up in
Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez (2009) and specify the underlying conditional mean function of
the relationship as:
E[remitit|REGIONi, DTt, voiceit, polstabit, goveffit, requalit, lawit, concorit] =
m(REGIONi, DTt, voiceit, polstabit, goveffit, requalit, lawit, concorit) + uit (1)
5Since 2012, World Bank renamed Workers’ remittances to Personal remittances.
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Figure 1: Conditional density plots of remittances and governance
where REGIONi represents a categorical unordered variable indicating the region (Africa,
Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America) country i belongs to, DTt is another categorical
indicating the year measurement (1996–2014),6 and the governance measures of voiceit,
polstabit, goveffit, requalit, lawit and concorit as defined above. remitit denotes migrants’
remittances while uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Eq.(1) measures the expected remit-
tances of country i in region REGIONi, at year DTt with specific values of governance
measures of of voiceit, polstabit, goveffit, requalit, lawit and concorit.
For emphasis, we do not loose sight of the need to control for potential endogen-
eity/omitted variable bias. For instance, Eq.(1) should be interpreted as the combination
6Since the WGI are not available for 1997, 1999 and 2001; hence they are excluded from the analysis.
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of a direct causal effect of governance measures on remittances, m, plus an indirect nonzero
effect of remittances on governance. More so, recovering the regression function m using
nonparametric techniques would require further assumptions (see Newey et al., 1999).
However, such techniques are computationally intensive, and beyond the scope of this
paper which is to investigate the relationship between remittances and governance without
parametric assumptions. Hence, we leave this for future research.
As earlier mentioned, our econometric strategy for estimating Eq.(1) uses a nonparamet-
ric kernel regression framework since it accommodate salient features of the data generating
process. Nonparametric kernel techniques does not impose ex ante functional form for the
relationship of interest; but rather it allows the data to determine the true shape of the
relationship. Hence, it provides a unifying estimation framework that relaxes parametric
assumptions of linearity, additivity, and no interaction among variables. Overall, it is robust
to arbitrary forms of non-linearities, heterogeneity and model specification. Consider a
generic nonparametric specification of Eq.(1) as follows:7
yi = m(xi) + ui,, i = 1 . . . N (2)
where yi denotes the remittances measure, and xi is a vector of both governance measures
and the categorical variables of region and time, and m(·) is assumed to be a smooth
continuous but otherwise unknown function.8 Three distinct data types are deducible from
the argument xi = (x
c
i , x
u
i , x
o
i ): x
c
i captures the vector of continuous regressors which in our
case are essentially the six governance measures, xui is for regressors that assume unordered
values (geographic regions) and xoi is for regressors that assume ordered discrete values
(time). For each data classification, different kernels are fitted: the second order Gaussian
kernel for continuous regressors; Aitchison-Aitken kernel for ordered discrete regressor; and
Li and Racine kernel for unordered discrete regressor.
Both REGIONi and DTt which represent standard dummy variables for unobservable
heterogeneity and time-specific effects in linear panel models are treated as additional
categorical explanatory variables via the generalized product kernel functions which also
allows for their interaction with other covariates (see Racine and Li, 2004; Li and Racine,
2007). For nonparametric kernel regression, both region and time effects are non-additive
and non-separable, and therefore does not require any form of data transformation (e.g.
“within” or first-difference transformation). This means that the level of the dependent
variable (“intercept”) and also the marginal effects of the regressors on the dependent
variable (“slopes”) may differ between time periods and between individuals and the time
7For simplicity, we omit the time subscript t.
8In other words, it does not assume linearity and separability of the variables, and the functional form
is a priori unknown
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effects may depend on the individual, while the individual effects may vary over time
(Czekaj and Henningsen, 2013).
The conditional mean function m(·) can be estimated using two nonparametric regression
methods: local-constant least-squares (LCLS)9 and local-linear least-squares (LLLS) (see
Henderson et al., 2013). Both estimators have the advantage of neither requiring functional
form assumptions for the conditional mean function nor does it assume a specific distribution
for the error term. The LCLS estimator of the conditional mean in Eq.(2) at a specific
point x is given by:
mˆ(x) = [i′K(x)i]−1i′K(x)y (3)
where y ≡ (y1, . . . , yn)′, i is a n × 1 vector of ones and K(x) is a diagonal n matrix of
kernel weighting function for mixed continuous and discrete data. The LCLS calculates a
(locally) weighted average of yi. In other words, it is the local average of yi to a point xi.
Thus, m(·) is estimated by locally averaging those values of yi which are ‘close’ in terms of
the values taken by the regressors. On the other hand, the LLLS estimator is derived from
a first-order Taylor expansion of Eq.(2) around a point x with respect to the continuous
regressors in xci :
yi ≈ m(x) + (xci − xc)β(xc) + ui (4)
where β(x) denotes the partial derivative of m(x) with respect to xc such that the LLLS
estimator provides an estimate of δ(x) ≡ [m(x), β(xc)]′ via
δˆ(x) = [X ′K(x)X]−1X ′K(x)y, (5)
where Xi = [1, (x
c
i − xc)] and K(x) is an n × n diagonal matrix of (product) kernel
weight functions. The intuition for the LLLS estimator is that δˆ(x) is obtained from a
locally weighted linear regression of yi on xi. In other words, it fits a line through x by
connecting point estimates that are in the neighbourhood of x, with each lines producing
estimates of the unknown function. Both LCLS and LLLS have their individual usefulness
despite being alternatives to one another. The LCLS can handle variable selection and
non-linearities. However, the LLLS is more robust as it can detect linearity and is a more
precise estimator than the LCLS since it correct for biases introduced from boundaries
related to the distributions of the covariates (Henderson et al., 2013).
The choice of bandwidth selection is very important when conducting nonparametric
analysis. Since the bandwidth controls the amount which the data is smoothed, large
9Also called the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator.
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bandwidths for continuous variables will result in over smoothing (low variance, high bias),
whereas, a small bandwidth is associated with less smoothing (high variance, low bias). This
trade-off is often circumvented by using an automated data-driven approach for bandwidth
estimation. A popular method in the literature is the least-squares cross validation (LSCV)
criteria, which chooses bandwidths to minimize the objective:
CV (h) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[yi − mˆ−i(xi)]2 (6)
where mˆ−i(xi) is the leave-one-out estimator of m(·). Although the bandwidth reflects the
degree of smoothing, it can also be useful in detecting whether the covariates are irrelevant
and if they enter the model linearly. According to Hall et al. (2007), LSCV has the ability
to smooth out irrelevant variables in the regression function and also detect linearity in
the continuous regressors for LCLS and LLLS respectively. This can be detected once the
bandwidth of any covariate reaches it upper bound. However, no cross-validation procedure
can computationally give bandwidths equal to their upper bound of infintiy (Henderson
et al., 2013). In such situation, Hall et al. (2007) suggest a rule-of-thumb involving the
use of a few standard deviations of the regressor (supposedly, two or three) as the upper
bound for relevance and linearity. In other words, when the bandwidth of a continuous
regressor exceeds two/three times the standard deviation of its associated variable, one can
conclude that it is irrelevant or enters the model linearly.10 Consequently, a continuous
regressor with a bandwidth equal to its upper bound indicate its irrelevance for LCLS, and
linearity in the case of LLLS. In the case of discrete regressors, their upper bounds are
quite obtainable and when it equals the upper bound the regressors are smoothed out.
As a caveat, nonparametric kernel regression suffer from a ‘curse of dimensionality’ –
the idea that as the dimension of the regressors increases, the rate of convergence of kernel
estimators deteriorates – which could lead to imprecise but still consistent estimation of the
object of interest. However, since the WGI measures are generated from parametric models,
Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez (2009) argues that their precision is dominated by the overall
slow rate of convergence of the nonparametric kernel estimators, and therefore requires no
correction of standard errors and/or testing techniques.11 Such corrections are imperative
in any parametric analysis using these perception-based measures.
In this paper, we use the LCLS to determine the relevance of each covariates in Eq.(1);
and later, LLLS for estimating the nonparametric partial effects and significance testing for
10This emphasizes the importance of obtaining for each covariate a separate bandwidth because the
cross-validation procedure will select large (small) bandwidth values for the covariates that are irrelevant or
enters linearly (relevant or enters nonlinearly).
11see Sperlich (2009) for a detailed explanation of this phenomenon.
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each covariates. The statistical significance of each covariates is obtained via bootstrapping
using the nonparametric test procedure of Racine et al. (2006). All the estimation analysis is
conducted using the np package of Hayfield and Racine (2008) in the R software environment.
4 Results
Despite the flexibility of nonparametric modelling, nonparametric estimates are very in-
volving in terms of interpretation because it does not assume a unique response coefficient of
the partial effects. Since these estimates are evaluated in the neighbourhood of any observa-
tion point, they are usually displayed via a graphical device, namely the ‘partial regression
plots” and/or “ partial gradients plots”, which graph the response of the dependent variable
for each of the regressor while holding the remaining regressors fixed at some constant value
(say, mean/median). However, partial plots becomes inappropriate as the distance of any
data point from the overall mean widens following an increase in data dimensionality. As
an alternative, the 45◦ plot for nonlinear regression as proposed by Henderson et al. (2012)
becomes useful in presenting multivariate gradients estimates. Here, we use both methods
to visualize the heterogeneity inherent in the nonparametric estimates. In addition, we also
present the partial effects at various quartiles of the estimated parameter distribution.
4.1 Nonparametric partial effects
Before presenting the nonparametric partial effects, Table 2 presents the cross-validated
bandwidths for both LCLS and LLLS estimation. The first column provides the upper bound
for the bandwidth of each regressors, which is taken as two times the standard deviation.
The second and third columns are the bandwidths for LCLS and LLLS respectively. As
mentioned earlier, when the bandwidth of a regressor reaches its upper bound then it is
considered irrelevant or it enters linearly respectively for LCLS and LLLS respectively.
As shown in Table 2, the bandwidth selection procedures of LCLS and LLLS reveal
salient information about our data, as all the governance measures have cross-validated
bandwidths that are below their respective upper bounds. For LCLS, this means that the
six governance measures are relevant in influencing remittances flows; whereas LLLS shows
that the effect of each governance measure on remittances is nonlinear. As such, the six
governance measures enters the model non-linearly. Therefore, assuming that the effects
are homogeneous across countries or regions based on parametric modelling will result in
model misspecification as well as wrong conclusions for policy prescriptions. In addition,
similar result is observed for both REGIONi and DTt as their bandwidths are below their
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Table 2: Summary of cross-validated bandwidths selection
Variables UB LCLS LLLS Remark
voice 1.5026 0.1475 0.2408 relevant, nonlinear
polstab 1.7156 0.3415 0.3200 relevant, nonlinear
goveff 1.2568 0.1964 1.1508 relevant, nonlinear
requal 1.2636 0.1090 0.2690 relevant, nonlinear
law 1.3024 0.0967 0.2934 relevant, nonlinear
concor 1.1902 0.2643 0.5019 relevant, nonlinear
REGION 0.750 0.0012 0.1150 relevant, heterogeneous
DT 1.000 0.5759 0.6624 relevant, nonlinear
upper bounds. This suggest considerable regional and time differences in remittance flows
respectively in our sample.
To capture the nature of non-linearity in the remittances and governance relationship,
Figure 2 presents the partial regression plots of the six governance measures, the region and
time specific-effects variables from a nonparametric kernel regression with the LLLS cross-
validated bandwidths. These partial plots are informative about the path of remittances
flows with respect to a particular governance measure, once conditioned on the remaining
variables to a pre-specified value such as the mean. Hence, the plots are just slices of the
fitted nonparametric hyperplane conditional on some variable. Within the partial plots
is the 90% confidence bands based on 399 bootstrap replications. These bootstrapped
confidence interval are not symmetric since they estimate stochastic variation of hyperplanes,
and not of univariate functions (Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez, 2009).
As shown, the effect of Voice and Accountability (voice) on remittances is non-monotonically
increasing. This could mean that as governments become less repressive allowing more
freedom of expression and participation of the citizens within the home country can en-
courage more remittance inflows into the country. For Political Stability (polstab), the
relationship with remittances is non-monotonic decreasing which implies that political
stability has a negative effect on remittances. Looking at Government Effectiveness (gov-
eff), its effect on remittances is relatively flat across it levels. Based on this, one could
conclude that it has a linear effect on remittances. However, linearity in this context is
not synonymous with an homogeneous effect as the variable may enter linearly, and still
have important interactions such that cannot be detected by a linear parametric model.12
Therefore, caution is emphasized in its interpretation until the statistical significance is
12It is difficult to test for linearity of a regressor as no formal statistical test exist as of date.
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Figure 2: Partial regression plots of the effect of governance on remittances using local
linear least-square (LLLS) cross-validated bandwidths from Table 2.
ascertain. For Regulatory Quality (requal), the effect is highly non-linear: at low levels,
the relationship declines slightly then it rises before declining again after which it rises
yet again non-monotonically. This indicates that requal has a series of both negative and
positive effects on remittances as it moves from low to high levels. In the case of Rule of
Law (law) and Control of Corruption (concor), both exhibit a U-shaped relationship with
remittances. That is, both negative and positive effect is recorded at low and high levels
respectively. As for REGIONi, Figure 2 shows regional variations in remittance flows: a
larger concentration is observed for both Latin America and Eastern Europe than in Africa
and Asia. As for time (i.e. DTt), it shows rising trend which is consistent with the fact
that remittances have increased significantly in the last two decades. Overall, the partial
regression plots reveals that the remittances-governance relationship is highly non-linear,
heterogeneous and very complex. One implication of this result is that better domestic
governance quality may not always lead to higher remittance flows. Hence, it is plausible
that poor governance quality can lead to higher emigration, and in turn, higher remittances
(Abdih et al., 2012).
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Further, to show the nature of heterogeneity, Table 3 presents the LLLS nonparametric
estimates for the six governance measures on remittances. Specifically, we report a vector
of partial effects for each variable corresponding to the mean as well as the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the estimated parameter distributions (labeled, Q1, Q2, and Q3) along
with their associated (wild) bootstrap standard errors. These partial effects estimates are
obtained for each variable by holding constant all other variables at their median values.
Table 3: Partial effects of governance on remittances
Mean Q1 Q2 Q3
voice 0.019 −0.885 −0.056 0.896∗
(0.204) (0.614) (0.381) (0.196)
polstab −0.962∗ −2.273∗ −0.778∗ 0.392
(0.044) (0.188) (0.168) (0.567)
goveff 0.520∗ −0.682 0.429∗ 1.815∗
(0.183) (0.651) (0.189) (0.423)
requal −0.962∗ −1.596∗ 0.011 1.381∗
(0.466) (0.739) (0.729) (0.167)
law 0.215 −0.791∗ 0.365 1.369∗
(1.065) (0.249) (0.304) (0.266)
concor 0.098 −0.049 0.000 0.313
(1.289) (0.131) (0.227) (0.178)
N 1,692
Note: Partial effects are estimated gradients from the LLLS regression
using bandwidths obtained in Column 3 of Table 3. The estimates
represents the mean, median (Q2), first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles
of the vector of partial effects for each regressor. (Wild) Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at 95%
confidence level.
Several features of the data are deducible from Table 3. First, there is substantial
variation in the partial effects when comparing each quartile value with another for each
variable. The inter-quartile range for the voice is approximately 1.781. In other words,
since the marginal effects measures the percentage change in remittance with respect to a
particular measure of governance, the absolute difference between the first (Q1) and third
(Q3) quartile for Voice and Accountability is 0.896−(−0.885) = 1.781 or 178.1 percentage
points. The associated inter-quartile range for other variables are: Political Stability (2.665),
Government Effectiveness (2.497), Regulatory Quality (2.977), and Control of Corruption
(0.362). This large variation provides further evidence of heterogeneity as observed from
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the graphical plots in Figure 2.
Second, we also find variations in the sign and statistical significance of each measure
of governance across the nonparametric parameter estimates distribution. Each estimates
constitutes a local weighted average at any observation, where the weights are determined by
the closeness of the other data points to that observation. In terms of the sign, Table 3 shows
that each governance measure is negatively signed at the first quartile of the distribution
while majority are positively signed from the second to the third quartiles of the estimated
parameter distribution. This suggest that remittances declines at lower levels of governance
quality whereas remittances increases with improved governance quality. For significance
at 95% confidence level, the partial effects of the Voice and Accountability (voice) is only
significant at the third quartile. Political Stability (polstab) is statistically different from
zero at the mean, first and median quartiles. Government Effectiveness (goveff) is significant
at the mean, median and upper quartile, while Regulatory Quality (requal) is significant at
the mean, lower and upper quartiles. The partial effects for Rule of Law (law) is statistically
different from zero only around the lower and upper quartiles, whereas Control of Corruption
is not significantly different from zero across the various metrics. Overall, our evidence
indicates that the effect of governance on remittances is far from uniform across countries
or regions. That is, the effect is heterogeneous across the sample.
4.2 Nonparametric significance test
Although, the partial effects at fixed points is analogous to the parametric t-test for
coefficient significance, it is however limited in determining the robustness of each covariates
in a nonparametric model setting. A formal nonparametric significance test is provided by
Racine et al. (2006), which is flexible to both continuous and categorical variables. The test
is a nonparametric equivalent of the standard t-test in parametric regression, and can test
for both linear as well as nonlinear relationship. Using the LLLS cross-validated bandwidths
obtained in Table 2, the pˆ-values at the 399 bootstrap replications for each covariates is
presented in Table 4. For accuracy, we use two different re-sampling bootstrap procedures,
namely the naive nonparametric bootstrap (np) and the wild bootstrap.
Across all levels of significance, the naive nonparametric bootstrap procedure shows that
except for Political Stability (polstab) and Regulatory Quality (requal), all other regressors
are statistically different from zero. However, all regressors are statistically significant when
the wild bootstrap procedure is applied. Therefore, since the latter procedure is robust to
the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, we conclude that all six governance measures
are relevant and important determinant of remittances. The statistical significance of both
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Table 4: Univariate Significance test
pˆ-values
np wild
voice 0.0802∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
polstab 0.1128 0.0125∗∗
goveff 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
requal 0.0025 0.0000∗∗∗
law 0.0777∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
concor 0.0251∗∗ 0.0451∗∗
REGION 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
DT 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
Note: Both np and wild represent the naive and
wild bootstrap procedures respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
∗ indicates 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively.
REGIONi and DTt variables supports our earlier assertion that there is significant regional
and time specific differences in remittances in our sample.
4.3 Heterogeneous parameter estimates – the 45◦ plot
To present the distribution of the nonparametric estimates which could not be visualize
using the partial regression plots, we use the 45◦ gradients (slopes) plot to show concisely
and simultaneously the magnitude, density, sign, standard errors and statistical significance
of the remittances-governance relationship (see Henderson et al., 2012). The elegance of
the 45◦ plot is such that it shows the nature of the heterogeneity existing in nonparametric
estimates without holding other regressors fixed at some specific values when considering a
specific variable of interest. Basically, it plots against itself the estimated marginal effects
of a regressor at each observation-specific values along with bootstrap confidence bands.
Figure 3 presents the 45◦ plot for all six governance measures. The observation-specific
estimate of the associated gradients are coloured red, while the upper and lower bounds
of a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval computed around the estimate are coloured in
blue and green respectively. The interpretation of the 45◦ plot follows thus: when the
upper and lower confidence bounds for an estimate are both in the upper (lower) right
(left) quadrant then the estimated observation-specific gradient is positive (negative) and
significant; however, when the upper and lower bounds of the confidence bounds straddle the
16
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Figure 3: 45-degree plots of the effects of governance on remittances for each of Voice and
Accountability (voice), Political Stability (polstab), and Government Effectiveness (goveff),
Regulatory Quality (requal), Rule of Law (law), and Control of Corruption (concor)
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horizontal axis, then the gradient estimate is not statistically different from zero (Henderson
et al., 2012).
As shown in Figure 3, all six governance measures have estimated positive and negative
effects, and are statistically significance despite differences in the density of the estimated
gradients. Specifically, most of the estimated gradients and confidence bounds for Voice
and Accountability (voice) are concentrated in the lower left quadrant which means that
the effect of voice on remittances are negative and outweighs the positive effects. The
estimated gradients for Political Stability (polstab) are mostly positive while it is mostly
negative for Government Effectiveness (goveff). Both Regulatory Quality (requal) and
Control of Corruption (concor) have a dominant positive effects while Rule of Law (law)
has a dominant negative effects for most of the estimated gradients. As clearly shown,
the 45◦ plot helps to characterize the existence of heterogeneity and non-linearity in the
remittances-governance relationship. Although, it does not show the explicit form of the
non-linearity of the estimated gradients, it however reveals an important information similar
to earlier results that the relationship need not be the same across countries or regions.
4.4 Regional partial effects
To further shed light on the relationship between governance and remittances, we conduct
the same analysis for each regional groupings in the sample. The essence is to provide
sub-samples evidence on the effects of governance on remittances as well as checking for
consistency with the full sample evidence. Table 5 presents the nonparametric partial effects
for each measure of governance on remittances across the regional groupings at the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of the estimated parameter distributions (labelled, Q1, Q2, and
Q3) with their associated wild bootstrap standard errors.
We find significant variations in the sign and statistical significance of each governance
measure at different points of the distribution similar to that of the full sample (see Table 3).
The signs of the nonparametric estimates are negative across all regions around the first
quartile and predominantly positive between the second and third quartiles. Most of the
partial effects with statistical significance concentrates around the first quartile (Q1) for
Africa, the second quartile (Q2) for Asia, and the third quartile (Q3) for Latin America.
Meanwhile, Eastern Europe has the least concentration of significant partial effects as
majority of its estimates are insignificant. Although puzzling, this outcome could be due
to an over-fitting of the data by the wild bootstrapping procedure. As mention earlier,
the significance test of the partial effects is examined at fixed points, and is therefore not
informative on the relevance of each governance on remittances for each regions.
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Consequently, Table 6 present the nonparametric significance test pˆ-values with 399 wild
bootstrap replications, and also their corresponding LLLS cross-validated bandwidths.13
Here, we concentrate on the significance of each governance measure rather than the
implication of their computed bandwidths. For Africa, all the governance measures are
significantly different from zero except for Regulatory Quality (requal). This can be
attributed to the lack credibility on the part of African governments to formulate and
implement policies that can drive the private sector development, and in turn, stimulate
remittance flows into the economy for investment opportunities. Moreover, both Political
Stability (polstab) and Control of Corruption (concor) are marginally significant at the 10%
significance level. This is interesting as the region has been beleaguered by political violence,
civil wars/strife and pervasive corruption. However, relative stability has gradually returned
to the region in the last decade, and efforts are been intensified in some countries to curb
corruption. Hence, time is required to ascertain whether both dimensions of governance
will yield strong effects in the near future.
In the case of Asia, we find other governance measures except requal and concor being
significantly different from zero. Again, since majority of the countries in Asia are developing
economies, basic developmental problems are prevalent including cracks in the governance
system through poor regulatory framework and corruption. As for Latin America, only the
voice variable is insignificant, while concor is marginally significant at the 10% significance
level. The insignificance of the voice variable contrast the fact that countries in the Latin
American region have complied with basic conditions that guarantee freedom of expression,
association and media, although concerns exist on restricting government opposition through
new legislation. For Eastern Europe, all six governance measures are statistically different
from zero, and therefore have strong importance for influencing remittances into the region.
In all, these results indicate that each governance measure have different importance across
each regions in influencing the extent of remittances flows. These differences could be
as result of variations in their respective stages of development, governance institutions
etc. Overall, the evidence is consistent with that of the full sample, that is, the effects of
governance on remittances is heterogeneous.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the effect of domestic governance quality on migrants’ remittances.
Specifically, it shed light on potential heterogeneity existing in the relationship which
13For the sake of space we do not present the partial regression plots for each region. However, these
partial plots with the code and data are available on request from the authors.
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previous studies using linear parametric techniques have been unable to unmask. Without
imposing any arbitrary functional form on the relationship, we use nonparametric regression
techniques which is robust to arbitrary forms of heterogeneity, non-linearity and model
specification, while accounting for the salient information about the data. This method is
applied to data for 109 countries using data on six governance measures from the World
Governance Indicators (WGI) database for the period 1996–2014. The selected are re-
grouped into four regions based on geography, and includes Africa, Asia, Latin America
and Eastern Europe. The analysis is conducted for both the full sample and sub-samples
based on the regional groupings.
In summary, we find that all six governance measures are statistically and economically
important in determining migrants’ remittance flows. What is more, the remittances-
governance relationship is highly non-linear, heterogeneous and complex. For instance,
specific aspects of the governance quality such as Rule of Law and Control of Corruption
exhibit a U-shape relationship with remittances. The effect of citizens’ participation in
government as well as freedom of expression and media is non-monotonically increasing, while
the likelihood of stability in government is non-monotonically decreasing with the level of
remittances. The effect of government’s effectiveness in formulating and implementing sound
policies is relatively flat, while government’s regulatory quality through the formulation and
implementation of sound private sector driven policies and regulations has no definite pattern
with series of positive and negative effects on remittances . In addition, specific aspects of
governance quality matter differently for remittances across each regional groupings. For
both Africa and Latin America, all six governance quality except Regulatory Quality and,
Voice and Accountability are statistically related to remittances respectively; while only
Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption are the exception for Asia. Eastern Europe
has all six governance measures significantly related to remittances.
Overall, our results are informative in that the effect of governance on remittances is
complex and not uniform across countries or regions, and time. In other words, higher
governance quality may not always result in higher remittance flows. On the contrary, poor
governance quality may stimulate more remittances through higher emigration. Therefore,
improving governance quality may not necessarily be a binding constraint for increasing
remittances because countries or regions are characterized by unique economic, political,
cultural, historical forces which could be influential in shaping remittances-governance
relationship. Hence, policy makers are cautioned against adopting a one-size fits all gov-
ernance reform agenda across countries. Instead, country-specific binding constraints are
to be determined and addressed with policies peculiar to each countries’ unique character-
istics. Lastly, important consideration for future research will be to address the issue of
endogeneity/omitted variable bias in a nonparametric framework as well as including other
22
covariates that influences the variability of remittances for sensitivity analysis.
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Appendix
Table A1: List of countries
Africa Swaziland Latin America Azerbijan
Algeria Tanzania Argentina Belarus
Benin Togo Barbados Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana Tunisia Belize Bulgaria
Cameroon Uganda Bolivia Croatia
Cape Verde Brazil Czech Rep.
Cote d’Ivoire Asia Colombia Estonia
Djibouti Bangladesh Costa Rica Georgia
Egypt Cambodia Dominica Hungary
Ethiopia China Dominica Rep. Kazakhstan
Ghana Fiji Ecuador Kyrgyz Rep.
Guinea India El Salvador Lithuania
Guinea Bissau Indonesia Grenada Macedonia
Kenya Iran Guatemala Moldova
Lesotho Jordan Guyana Poland
Madagascar Lao DPR Haiti Romania
Malawi Lebanon Honduras Russia
Mali Malaysia Jamaica Slovenia
Mauritius Maldives Mexico Slovakia
Mozambique Mongolia Nicaragua Tajikistan
Morocco Nepal Panama Turkey
Namibia Pakistan Paraguay Ukraine
Niger Papua New Guinea Peru
Nigeria Philippines St. Lucia
Rwanda Samoa St. Vincent
Sao Tome & Principe Solomon Island Suriname
Senegal Sri Lanka Venezuela
Seychelles Thailand
Sierra Leone Vanuatu Eastern Europe
South Africa West Bank & Gaza Albania
Sudan Yemen Armenia
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